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The quintessential distinguishing feature of the American criminal justice system
is the jury. Juries representative of their communities perform the interrelated functions
in criminal trials of rendering verdicts that reflect a sense of community justice and
giving normative content to law. When those functions are successfully performed, the
jury lends legitimacy to the criminal justice system, bolstering public confidence in the
extant rule of law.
Yet the criminal jury’s legitimating functions are critically dependent on its own
legitimacy, which in turn requires an examination of two key questions. First, what
constitutes a “representative” jury, and second, what is the relevant community the jury is
supposed to represent? The first of these questions, grounded as it is in the Sixth
Amendment guarantee that a criminal defendant enjoys the right to an impartial jury
drawn from a fair cross-section of the community, has received a fair amount of attention
from both courts and scholars.1 The second, arguably more profound and certainly prior

*

Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. I thank Amitai Etzioni,
Stanley Fish and Ian Ayres for their kind and helpful comments on a previous draft, and
my colleagues at Valpo Law (particularly JoEllen Lind and Alex Geisinger) for their
insights. Thanks also to Michelle Dougherty, Kelly Hartzler and Marissa Bracke for
excellent research assistance, and to the Law Library staff. The idea for this article
sprang from discussions with my colleague David Vandercoy, an incredibly able lawyer
whose work in criminal defense cases has given these issues both depth and immediacy.
It was his concern that his clients receive fair trials by juries comprised of a fair crosssection of their communities that prompted this article, and I thank him both for his
unwavering support of this project and his devotion to the representation of those in our
society who most need it.
1
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question, has remained largely unexamined.2 The purpose of this Article is to fill that
gap, and to do so using communitarian and postmodern theories to explore the idea of
community as it pertains to the composition of juries.
The issues examined here are not, however, purely theoretical. They have grave
practical importance for criminal defendants facing trial. Lawyers on both sides of
criminal prosecutions have long tried to manipulate the composition of juries in an effort
to obtain favorable results at trial. Devices like peremptory challenges and change of
venue motions are routinely used in these efforts, and the strategic effects and
Jural Districting: Selecting Impartial Juries Through Community Representation, 52
VAND. L. REV. 353 (1999) [hereinafter Forde-Mazrui, Jural Districting]; Stanton D.
Krauss, Representing the Community: A Look at the Selection Process in Obscenity
Cases and Capital Sentencing, 64 IND. L.J. 617 (1989); Mitchell S. Zuklie, Comment,
Rethinking the Fair Cross-Section Requirement, 84 CAL. L. REV. 101 (1996).
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embodied in the Sixth Amendment that the accused enjoys the right to be tried “by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
See generally Steven A. Engel, The Public’s Vicinage Right: A Constitutional Argument,
75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1658 (2000) (arguing that the public has a constitutional right to have
criminal trials adjudicated locally). Engel uses history and constitutional theory to make
the case that the community which is “aggrieved” by the commission of a particular
crime has a paramount, constitutionally protected interest in being the venue for its
prosecution. He premises his argument on the notion that legislatures (state and federal)
are properly equipped to “define the vicinage community” by drawing judicial districts.
See id. at 1708-09. He does not, however, consider the question whether state or federal
legislatively-drawn boundaries adequately capture the community that criminal juries
should represent, particularly in larger federal districts. See also K. Winchester Gaines,
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See, e.g., Davis v. Warden, 867 F.2d 1003, 1009-10 (7th Cir. 1989)("County lines or
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believe, however, that because the decision is somewhat arbitary, it is a decision that
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States v. Grisham, 63 F.3d 1074, 1079 (11th Cir. 1995)(though vicinage is a
constitutional "constraint on the source of the jury, . . . the size of the vicinage was left to
Congressional determination.").
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constitutional implications of these are well-documented. But a new, subtler
manipulation of the jury composition scheme is emerging, one that makes the theoretical
issues around the concept of community immediate and compelling. That is, federal
prosecutors are taking control of increasing numbers of prosecutions of crimes previously
within the purview of state prosecutors. This “federalization” of so-called street crime,
notably murders and robberies, has the effect in most states of widening the “community”
from which jurors will be drawn from a county within a state to a federal district or
division encompassing several counties. A troubling second-order effect of this practice,
then, is to de-localize juries, often diluting any significant minority representation.
A concrete example illustrates the problem, and will provide a case study for the
analysis to follow. A robbery takes place in a gun store located in an urban area with a
high minority population. During the course of the robbery, the gun shop owner is killed.
A young African-American man is arrested for the crime. The United States Attorney
decides to pursue a federal prosecution, basing federal jurisdiction on criminal code
provisions enacted by Congress under its Commerce Clause powers, and seeks the death
penalty under federal law. Because the federal district encompasses not just the urban
county, but also “collar” suburban counties, the jury pool from which the federal jury will
be drawn has a very different demographic makeup from one that would be drawn, under
state law, in a state prosecution within the county where the crime took place. The wider
reach of the federal court means that the jury venire panel consists of many fewer
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minority members, and the prospect that the defendants will face an all-white, or nearly
all-white, jury becomes much more likely.3
In the past thirty years, the Supreme Court has been forced to wrestle with
difficult issues of race and the jury,4 and its two strands of jurisprudence (one based on
the fair cross-section requirement and the other on the equal protection clause) have
proven difficult to reconcile.5 The difficulty lies in the seeming inconsistency between
the fair cross-section requirement’s privileging of juror diversity for the sake of the
differing perspectives brought to the decisionmaking table and the equal protection
doctrine’s rejection of stereotyping as predictive of juror perspectives. Rather than
mount another attempt to integrate these competing constitutional principles into a
coherent doctrine, this article seeks to refocus the debate toward a more communitarianbased view of the jury, using the federal versus state venire problem as a lens.
The article thus proceeds in three major parts. The first explains the process by
which juries are assembled in federal and state courts under constitutional and statutory
guidelines. The relative geographic spheres encompassed by state and federal jury pools
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A relatively old federal venue statute requires that capital cases be tried "in the county
where the offense was committed, where that can be done without great inconvenience."
18 U.S.C. § 3235 (2000). The section has been interpreted not to give defendants
absolute rights to trial in a certain county and to vest discretion in trial courts on the
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will be explored, using five metropolitan areas of varying populations around the
country6 as examples, with particular attention to the demographic consequences of using
either federal districts or state counties to define jury venire pools by reference to the
latest census data. Part II examines communitarian7 and postmodern theory in an effort
to define the relevant “communities” from which “fair” cross-sections can be drawn to
form politically legitimate juries. In particular, the key postmodern precept of
constructed meaning has profound implications for the work of juries: when juries as
collective democratic bodies give content to legal norms, they form interpretive
communities.8 What gives a community coherence such that it can legitimately agree on,
and express through a jury, what constitutes, for example, “aggravating” or “mitigating”
circumstances that would warrant the imposition of a death sentence? Is that sort of
coherence inherently local9 and therefore dissipated when one moves beyond fairly small
geographic boundaries?
Finally, Part III will synthesize the practice with the theory and consider the
implications of the federalization trend in criminal prosecutions. If relatively more of our
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The five areas, randomly chosen, are Los Angeles, California, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, Gary, Indiana, Detroit, Michigan, and Dallas, Texas.
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"Communitarianism" has been described as "a social philosophy that maintains that
societal formulations of the good are both needed and legitimate. Communitarianism is
often contrasted with classical liberalism, a philosophical position that holds each
individual should formulate the good. Communitarians examine the way shared
conceptions of the good (values) are formed, transmitted, enforced and justified." THE
OXFORD COMPANION TO POLITICS OF THE WORLD 158 (Joel Krieger ed., 2001).
8
The concept of “interpretive communities” was first articulated by the literary-legal
theorist Stanley Fish to describe why language sometimes seems to have embedded
meaning. See generally STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?: THE
AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES (1980) and infra notes __ and accompanying
text. Compare the notion of “communities of interest” developed in Supreme Court cases
on legislative districting. See Forde-Mazrui, Jural Districting, supra note 2, at 382-88.
9
Fish argues repeatedly that it is, though not in this (jury) context.
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criminal law is to be, in essence, defined by federal as opposed to state juries, then it is
essential that we recognize this not just as a dilution of local power (a traditional concern
of federalism) but as an affront to the ideal of communitarian justice embodied in the
criminal jury.

I. Assembling Federal and State Jury Venires
Jury panels are assembled in both state and federal courts against a backdrop mosaic
of constitutional,10 statutory, and administrative law. I thus begin my description with a
short explanation of federal constitutional requirements for the assembling of jury venire
panels, requirements that apply to all criminal jury panels in both state and federal courts.
I then move to an examination of the statutory and administrative process used in federal
court to assemble jury venires. Finally, the demographic consequences of drawing juries
from federal districts rather than state counties will be described, using five sample
metropolitan areas to demonstrate the dilution effect of federal districting.

A. Constitutional Requirements in the Assembly of Jury Venire Panels
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees defendants
charged with crimes the right to a trial by an "impartial" jury.11 This guarantee has long
been interpreted by the Supreme Court to mean that juries must be drawn from a "fair
cross-section" of the community.12 Enforcing this fair cross-section requirement has
engaged the courts in an evolving process, from early cases striking down overt
exclusions of distinct demographic groups (primarily those based on gender and race) to
10

For state jury venires, both federal and state constitutional law will control the process.
U.S. CONST. amend VI.
12
Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
11
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later cases involving more subtle forms of discrimination. All the cases make clear,
however, that the Sixth Amendment right to a fair cross-section applies only to the jury
venire,13 not to the actual "petit" jury panel that ends up serving in any particular case.14
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has also served as a
check on racial discrimination in jury selection. Not long after the post-Civil War
amendments to the U.S. Constitution were ratified, a case came to the Supreme Court on
the issue of whether an outright exclusion of African-American men from jury service
violated the new concept of "equal protection" under the law. In Strauder v. West
Virginia,15 the Supreme Court held that it did, a holding that affects both the jury venire
and the petit jury.16 Later, the Court invoked the fair cross-section requirement of the
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S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946))). See also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538
(1975) ("[I]n holding that petit juries must be drawn from a source fairly representative of
the community we impose no requirement that petit juries actually chosen must mirror
the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the population."). As to the
petit jury, the tool for inclusion of previously underrepresented groups has been the Equal
Protection clause. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (Batson rule
extended to peremptory challenges based on gender); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986) (equal protection violated by use of peremptory challenges to exclude prospective
jurors solely on account of their race).
15
100 U.S. 303 (1879).
16
See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 479 (1990) ("[T]he Fourteenth Amendment's
prohibition of unequal treatment in general and racial discrimination in particular . . .
therefore has equal application at the petit jury and the venire stages . . . ").
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Sixth Amendment to strike down both laws and practices that had the effect of excluding
African-Americans,17 daily wage-earners,18 Latinos,19 and women20 from jury service.
However, the systematic exclusion of women and racial minorities from jury
service persisted in some states well into the twentieth century.21 The Supreme Court
finally, and definitively, announced in the 1970s that schemes requiring women to
affirmatively register their desire to serve as jurors22 or that granted automatic
exemptions to women summoned to serve23 violate the fair cross-section requirement.
In Taylor v. Louisiana,24 the Supreme Court identified three purposes served by
the fair cross-section requirement: "[1] guard[ing] against the exercise of arbitrary power
[and invoking] the commonsense judgment of the community as a hedge against the
overzealous or mistaken prosecutor . . .; [2] [preserving] public confidence in the fairness
of the criminal justice system; and [3] sharing . . . the administration of justice [as] a
phase of civic responsibility."25 The Court has extolled these functions as clear
justifications for striking down rules that overtly exclude racial minorities and women.26
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419 U.S. 522 (1975).
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Id. at 530-31 (emphasis added).
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Nevertheless, the Court has refused to find either fair cross-section or equal protection
violations in some cases in which statistical data demonstrated gross under-representation
of racial minorities in the jury pool. Brown v. Allen27 involved the Alabama trial of an
African-American man for rape, which resulted in a conviction and death sentence. The
Supreme Court held that despite the gross underrepresentation of African-Americans in
the jury pool,28 no Sixth Amendment violation existed, noting the efforts the county had
made to increase the number of African-Americans in the jury pool.29 Some twelve years
later, the Supreme Court revisited the problem of race and juries in Alabama. In Swain v.
Alabama,30 the Court declared that "a defendant in a criminal case is not constitutionally
entitled to demand a proportionate number of his race on the jury which tries him nor on
the venire or jury roll from which petit jurors are drawn."31 Absent a showing of
purposeful discrimination against an identifiable group, the Court held, a disparity of as

blacks, . . . women, . . . and Mexican-Americans . . . from jury service clearly
contravene[s] all three of the aforementioned purposes for the fair-cross-section
requirement. Because these groups [are] excluded for reasons completely unrelated to
the ability of members of the group to serve as jurors in a particular case, the exclusion
raise[s] at least the possibility that the composition of juries would be arbitrarily skewed
in such a way as to deny criminal defendants the benefit of the common-sense judgment
of the community.").
27
344 U.S. 443 (1953).
28
The source list, comprised of all county property and poll taxpayers, included 16%
African-Americans, as compared to 33.5% African-Americans over twenty-one years of
age in the general population. Of the sixty potential jurors called for the defendant's case,
five were African-American. Id. at 469.
29
The county had eliminated poll taxes, minimum property ownership requirements, and
the requirement that all taxes be paid for eligibility for jury service. Id. at 470.
30
380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled in part by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
31
Id. at 208.
9

much as 10% between a group's representation in the jury pool and its representation in
the general population does not amount to an equal protection problem.32
The Supreme Court has subsequently settled on a three-part analysis to ascertain
whether a violation of the fair cross-section requirement has occurred: "the defendant
must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a 'distinctive' group in the
community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are
selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the
community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the
group in the jury-selection process."33
Lower courts have read the 10% criterion of Swain into the second prong of the
Duren analysis.34 In United States v. Phillips,35 for example, the seventh circuit held that
a jury venire panel wholly devoid of African-Americans was not a Sixth Amendment
problem when African-Americans comprised only 6.1% of the population.36 Thus, in any
district or division that lacks a 10% minority population, a Sixth Amendment fair cross-
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Id. at 208-09. For an explanation of the statistical deficiencies in the Supreme Court's
analysis of the data presented in Swain, see Mark McGillis, Jury Venires: Eliminating the
Discrimination Factor by Using a Statistical Approach, 3 HOW. SCROLL 17, 31-33
(1995). Swain also held that the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to remove
prospective African-American jurors did not violate the Equal Protection clause. 380
U.S. at 226. This aspect of Swain was overruled by the Court's decision in Batson, which
now requires race-neutral use of peremptory challenges. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79 (1986).
33
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).
34
Swain was an equal protection case, but the test to state an equal protection claim for
minority underrepresentation in the jury pool generally mirrors the fair cross-section test.
The difference is that equal protection claims require a showing of intentional
discrimination.
35
239 F.3d 829 (7th Cir. 2001).
36
Id. at 842. The trial had taken place in the federal court in South Bend, Indiana.
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section claim could never be mounted, even in the complete absence of minority
representation in the jury pool.37
Defining the relevant scope of the community from which a fair cross-section will
be drawn, therefore, matters critically to the possibility of genuine diversity on the jury.
If minority communities tend to be concentrated in particular geographic areas,38 smaller
vicinage districts are much more likely to capture a critical mass of minority presence.
And this critical mass is essential to even trigger a fair cross-section analysis under the
Sixth Amendment.

B. Assembling the Jury Venire in Federal Court
With the constitutional backdrop explained above, we now turn to a description of
the process by which jury venire panels are actually assembled in federal courts. Because
a fairly elaborate statutory scheme governs the process, there is some degree of
uniformity amongst federal districts around the country with regard to jury selection. The
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This is known as the "absolute disparity" method for measuring underrepresentation, by
which "the percentage of representation of a distinct group on the venire is subtracted
from the percentage of representation of the group in the population as a whole." Ted M.
Eades, Revisiting the Jury System in Texas: A Study of the Jury Pool in Dallas County, 54
SMU L. REV. 1813, 1822 (2001). Though other statistical methods are used by some
courts, most use the 10% floor in both equal protection cases (which require a showing of
intentional discrimination) and fair cross-section cases. Id. at 1824. See also United
States v. Grisham, 63 F.3d 1074, 1079 (11th Cir. 1995)(using absolute disparity analysis
with the 10% rule); United States v. Weaver, 267 F.3d 231, 240-43 (3d Cir. 2001) (using
absolute disparity analysis, but without explicit use of the 10% rule); United States v.
Rioux, 97 F.3d 648, 656 (2d Cir. 1996)(using absolute disparity analysis, though noting
its previous refusal to use absolute numbers in a case where evidence existed that
exclusion of minorities from jury pool was not benign).
38
See generally Nancy A. Denton, The Persistence of Segregation: Links Between
Residential Segregation and School Segregation, 80 MINN. L. REV. 795 (1999).
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uniformity is imperfect, though, because the statute itself allows some flexibility for local
federal district courts in developing their jury selection plans to fit local conditions.
Before 1968, federal courts often used a "key man" method of assembling a pool
of prospective jurors.39 This method utilized well-connected individuals or organizations
to suggest citizens who, because of their esteem within the community, would make good
jurors. The obviously exclusionary character of this method finally led both to a court
decision striking it down40 and to a new statute designed to produce a fairer cross-section
of the community. The federal Jury Selection Act,41 enacted by Congress in 1968, was
designed to prevent discrimination in jury service on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, national origin, or economic status.42
The statute requires federal district courts to use lists of registered or actual voters
as their "source lists" or, if necessary to "foster the policy and protect the rights"
identified by the statute, some other source or sources of names.43 Some federal districts
use district-wide plans to draw jurors; others adopt separate plans for divisions or
combination of divisions within the judicial district.44 The statute specifically requires
that the procedures contained in the jury plans of each division or district "shall be
designed to ensure the random selection of a fair cross section of the persons residing in
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JACK FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 539 (3d
ed. 1999).
40
See Rabinowitz v. United States, 366 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1966).
41
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1871 (2000).
42
See 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (2000).
43
28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2) (2000).
44
See 28 U.S.C. § 1863(a) (2000) ("Separate plans may be adopted for each division or
combination of divisions within a judicial district.").
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the community in the district or division wherein the court convenes."45 Thus, the statute
explicitly defines the community from which a fair cross-section of jurors is to be drawn
as the entire federal district or division. In most federal districts, this will be a multicounty area.

C. The Demographic Consequences of Assembling Juries in Federal v. State Courts
This section examines five sample metropolitan areas in an effort to determine the
demographic consequences of assembling juries in the state courts, organized by county,
as opposed to the federal courts, organized by federal districts. In each of the five
samples, metropolitan areas are essentially comprised of a city which constitutes the
major population center of a county surrounded by suburban collar counties. Census data
demonstrate that the minority population is higher in the urban county than it is in the
suburban collar counties.46 Thus, the federal districts that are drawn to include the collar
counties will dilute the minority representation in the jury pool for federal cases.47

45

28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(3) (2000). Further, the plan "shall ensure that names of persons
residing in each of the counties, parishes, or similar political subdivisions within the
judicial district or division are placed in a master jury wheel; and shall ensure that each
county, parish, or similar political subdivision within the district or division is
substantially proportionally represented in the master jury wheel for that judicial district,
division, or combination of divisions." Id.
46
When using census data to determine representativeness on jury venire panels, the
analysis is necessarily imprecise, because the census does not measure the jury-eligible
population. Thus, courts are forced to do a crude comparison, between the percentage of
a minority group in the population base and the percentage of that group in the jury pool.
See Eades, supra note 37, at 1823 (though some courts have objected, the Supreme Court
uses general census data in jury representativeness cases, and census information "is the
most accurate, readily available source of data.").
47
See Appendix A for a graphic representation of the census data.
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For example, Indiana is divided into two federal judicial districts, northern and
southern.48 The northern district is then subdivided into three divisions, one of which is
the Hammond Division.49 Lake County, in the Hammond division, is where the city of
Gary is located, and has a large minority population. The surrounding counties are
overwhelmingly white. Thus, moving beyond Lake County to draw a jury pool for
federal court cases inevitably dilutes minority representation. While the AfricanAmerican population of Lake County is 25.3%, blacks are 19.7% of the Hammond
division because of the addition of virtually all-white Porter County. Moreover, the
dilution effect is often exacerbated by intra-district transfers, which are routinely granted
and are not considered a fair cross-section problem because the community is defined by
statute as district- or division-wide.50 When a case is transferred from the Hammond
division, for example, to the South Bend division, juries will be drawn from a division in
which only 6.3% of the population is African-American.
The demographics in the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania area are even starker. The
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which is the federal district encompassing the city of
Philadelphia and its namesake county, is comprised of eight additional collar counties.
The federal court uses voter registration lists to assemble its jury pool; the state courts in

48

28 U.S.C. § 94 (2000).
Id. The Hammond Division is comprised of the counties of Benton, Carroll, Jasper,
Lake, Newton, Porter, Tippecanoe, Warren and White. The Hammond Division holds
court in Hammond, with jurors drawn from Lake and Porter counties, and Lafayette, with
jurors drawn from the other counties.
50
See Davis v. Warden, 867 F.2d 1003,1008 (7th Cir. 1989)("According to the Supreme
Court, the sixth amendment entitles a defendant to a jury drawn from the federal district
in which the crime was committed, although the jury may be drawn from a division of the
district rather than the entire district . . .[l]ower courts have held therefore that a jury
selection system satisfies the sixth amendment if the jury is selected from either the entire
district or a division of that district.").
49
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Philadelphia County use both voter and drivers' registration lists. The percentage of
African-Americans in Philadelphia County is 43.2%; in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, that number drops to 16.8%.
A similar phenomenon exists in the Detroit metropolitan area. The city is located
in Wayne County, which has a 42.2% black population. The Eastern District of
Michigan, Southern Division, encompasses Wayne County along with eight other
counties, yielding a 21.5% overall African-American population percentage.
Significantly, the state of Michigan does not have a death penalty. Thus, the
federalization of murder trials in Michigan makes the death penalty available at the same
time that it dilutes minority representation in the jury pool.
In the Los Angeles and Dallas areas, the story is an interesting reflection of the
changing demographics in America generally. In both metro areas, the Hispanic
population is larger than other minority groups. And in both areas, the proportion of both
Hispanic and African-American populations gets diluted by federal divisions that include
suburban counties along with the county in which each city is located, though the
disparity is not as great as in Philadelphia or Detroit.51

II. Defining the Relevant Community: Theoretical Perspectives

51

In California, the proportion of African-Americans in Los Angeles County is 9.8%
versus 8.8% in the Central federal district, western division, which encompasses Los
Angeles, San Luis Obispo, Santa Barbara, and Ventura Counties. The proportion of
Hispanics in Los Angeles County is 44.6%, as opposed to 42.8% in the federal division.
In Texas, Dallas County has 20.3% African-Americans and 29.9% Hispanics as opposed
to the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, which has 18.1% African-Americans
and 26.9% Hispanics because it incorporates six additional counties.
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The demonstration that the demographic makeup of the jury venire pool will vary
in state and federal court, at least in the five sample districts examined, pushes toward a
fundamental question: what is the relevant community from which the "fair crosssection" of jurors should be drawn? Both state counties and federal districts are political
subdivisions, drawn by historical accidents or political expediencies. But does either
geographically-defined space capture the sort of coherence that could fairly be said to
constitute community in a more meaningful sense of the word? I look now to two
distinctive theoretical schools in an effort to give content to the concept of "community"
as used in the fair cross-section context. The first is the communitarian movement,
whose agenda has been most famously articulated by sociologist Amitai Etzioni. The
second is the postmodern linguistic theory of "interpretive communities," an idea
championed by literary and legal scholar Stanley Fish.
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A. Communitarian Theory
In his book The New Golden Rule: Community and Morality in a Democratic
Society,52 Amitai Etzioni53 makes a powerful case for the importance of a core of shared
values54 in defining moral order. This "core of shared values" enables a community to
"formulate specific public policies [by providing] criteria for settling differences in a
principled rather than an ad hoc or interest-based manner."55 The problem, of course, is
the tension inherent in a pluralistic society such as the United States between these
"shared core values" and the notion of a liberal state fueled by individual freedoms.
Much of Etzioni's book is devoted to the ongoing debates between liberals and
communitarians as to the shifting contours of individual freedom and autonomy in
contraposition to the concept of the common good. Moreover, communitarian thinkers
make clear that "communal values must be judged by external and overriding criteria,
based on shared human experience."56 But rather than focusing on the imposition of
values on some pre-existing group (geographical or otherwise) of people, communitarian
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AMITAI ETZIONI, THE NEW GOLDEN RULE: COMMUNITY AND MORALITY IN A
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (1996).
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Etzioni, University Professor at George Washington University, is the founding
president of the Communitarian Network and the editor of The Responsive Community, a
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movement.
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Id. at 87.
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See Amitai Etzioni, The Responsive Communitarian Platform: Rights and
Responsibilities, reprinted in AMITAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY: RIGHTS,
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THE COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA 255 (1993).
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theory posits that the values themselves actually help to define the community.57 Thus
there is always a complex symbiotic interplay between any moral decisionmaker,
including a juror, and her community: the community shapes her values just as her
values shape her community.58
At this point one confronts the problem of levels of generality. If values rather
than geography are a better determinant of community, then at what level of specificity
should the values be articulated? Michael J. Perry, after affirming that "moral
deliberation requires community"59 (in the context of constitutional interpretation) argues
that there exists a national "judging community" at the level of generally shared ideals
like freedom of speech and religion, due process of law and equal protection.60 Because
those ideals are by nature "underdeterminate,"61 they are directly useful in situations that
test the core of the principle of each62 and indirectly useful as tools to mediate consensus
and dissensus.63 But when decisionmakers are faced with the task of answering a
particular question, as jurors in criminal trials always are, this broad notion of community
may well break down. As jurors struggle with difficult moral decisionmaking
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"The starting point, typically, is shared values, not individual choices or formulations of
the good." ETZIONI, THE NEW GOLDEN RULE, supra note 50, at 93.
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ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY, supra note 54, at 31 ("[W]e find reinforcement
for our moral inclinations and provide reinforcement to our fellow human beings, through
the community.").
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MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW: A BICENTENNIAL ESSAY 157
(1988).
60
Id. at 154.
61
Id. at 155.
62
Id. at 155-56. For example, there would likely be "virtual consensus" as to whether the
government could compel allegiance to a particular religion. Id.
63
Id. at 156. For example, the shared ideal would give decisionmakers a point of
reference to decide whether a particular policy violates the core principle. Id. Perry
argues that constitutional discourse, in nonoriginalist constitutional adjudication, is "at its
idealized best, . . . the moral discourse of the constitutional community." Id. at 158.
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(constrained only loosely by the judge's instructions on the relevant law), the relevant
communities that shape the values brought to the deliberation table cannot be so broadly
defined.64
Indeed, communitarianism has been criticized for its failure to define what
constitutes a community for the purpose of deliberating moral or societal questions.65
Modern life is organized such that most people identify with many more than one
community.66 Daniel Bell describes the communities that matter for moral deliberation
as those that constitute identity, and then proposes criteria "for distinguishing constitutive
communities from other forms of association, contingent attachments, fleeting 'facts'
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"'[W]hich community is appealed to for the intersubjective criteria or grounds of
judgment, since the latter will vary as one varies the community appealed to . . . [W]here
allegiances conflict, it is not decided in advance which community will supply the basis
of judgment. Does my commitment to a particular people outweigh, or is it outweighed
by, my commitment to' some other group? '[I]t [is not] immediately apparent to whom
the judgment is addressed: a community of the past or one projected into the future; a
particular national community or a community of nations; a tiny circle or [of?] associates
or universal mankind. . . . Thus, the claim—judgment implies judging community—
gives rise to the question: which community?'" PERRY, supra note 57, at 157-58 (quoting
RONALD BEINER, POLITICAL JUDGMENT 142-43, 146 (1983)) (passages rearranged).
65
See DANIEL BELL, COMMUNITARIANISM AND ITS CRITICS 91 (1993) ("[E]veryone
knows that communitarians place special emphasis upon communal life, but few have a
clear grasp of what sort of community we are to value."). Bell's book is written in the
form of a two-character play, in the manner of the movie My Dinner with Andre. Both
characters are graduate philosophy students; over dinner and wine in a Paris restaurant,
the character Anne describes her doctoral thesis which is a defense of communitarianism
against the character Philip's various critiques.
66
German sociologist Ferdinand Tonnies, in the nineteenth century, described what he
called gemeinschaft as an ideal of a local community that is static, orderly, and intimate
in contrast to gesellschaft, the modern large-scale society of individuals who form
associations only for instrumental reasons. See generally FERDINAND TÖNNIES,
COMMUNITY AND SOCIETY (Charles P. Loomis trans., Harper & Row 1963) (1887); see
also BELL, supra note 63, at 90-91. Modern communitarian thinkers reject such a strict
dichotomy, recognizing that it is possible for people to function in our modern large-scale
society and still be part of constitutive communities. Id. at 91-92.
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about oneself, and so on."67 Significantly, constitutive communities are revealed by their
members' self-definition and are aspects of their identities that "can't be shed like
membership of a voluntary association."68 And the values of those constitutive
communities inform, in a way that is both subtle and sometimes dimly perceived even by
the member herself, every act of moral deliberation.69 Bell identifies three kinds of
constitutive communities: communities of place, of memory (that is, a shared history),
and of "face to face personal interaction governed by sentiments of trust, cooperation, and
altruism."70 Thus, the work of moral decisionmaking, which is the key task performed by
juries, is according to communitarian theory informed by the jurors' constitutive
communities—defined geographically, by shared histories, and, most significantly, by the
sort of face-to-face personal interactions that demand both value expression and
accountability. This suggests that relatively smaller community boundaries, where
repeated interpersonal interactions are more likely to take place, better capture the idea of
community that would most matter for moral decisionmaking, including that done by
juries.
The idea that local communities have intrinsic value that is endangered by modern
industrial and transient societal trends is not new. Early in the twentieth century,
Progressive philosopher John Dewey described the corrupting influence of technology on
67

Id. at 94.
Id. at 95.
69
See id. at 103 ("[T]hree criteria [are] employed to distinguish 'constitutive commuities'
from contingent attachments. . . . one should start with how it is that people in fact define
themselves, i.e. how they answer the question 'who are you?' Next. . . . a constitutive
community provides a largely background way of meaningful thinking, acting, and
judging. The last criterion [is that] one loses a commitment to a constitutive community
at the price of being thrown into a state of severe disorientation where one is unable to
take a stand on many things of significance.").
70
Id. at 185.
68
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the preexisting local communities of the day, noting that "the machine age in developing
the Great Society has invaded and partially disintegrated the small communities of former
times without generating a Great Community."71 Dewey worried that the loss of those
smaller communities would portend a diminishment of American democracy, because he
considered "genuine community life"—that is, a common identity—to be necessary to
effective self-governance.72
At the turn of the twenty-first century, Robert D. Putnam famously described a
similar phenomenon—that is, a loss of what he calls "social capital"—as "bowling
alone."73 In his book of that name, Putnam describes the waning participation of
Americans in both formal and informal social institutions, using the decline of league
bowling as a symbolic example.74 While the general theme of Putnam's book is that
Americans desperately need to recapture a sense of community,75 he pointedly avoids
nostalgic visions of a past "golden age" by noting both that social capital can have
seriously negative externalities for those outside the community76 and that debates over
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JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS (1926), reprinted in 2 THE LATER
WORKS OF JOHN DEWEY, 1925-1953 at 314 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1984), quoted in
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PHILOSOPHY at 208 (1996).
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See SANDEL, supra note 69, at 208.
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ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN
COMMUNITY (2000). "'[S]ocial capital refers to connections among individuals—social
networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them. In that
sense social capital is closely related to what some have called 'civic virtue.' The
difference is that 'social capital' calls attention to the fact that civic virtue is most
powerful when embedded in a dense network of reciprocal social relations." Id. at 19.
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Id. at 111-13.
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See, e.g., id. at 28 ("[W]e Americans need to reconnect with one another. That is the
simple argument of this book.").
76
Putnam notes that like other forms of capital, social capital "can be directed toward
malevolent, antisocial purposes . . . [t]herefore it is important to ask how the positive
consequences of social capital—mutual support, cooperation, trust, institutional
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the loss of community are nothing new in American intellectual life.77 Indeed, Putnam's
thesis is not that community bonds have been in steady decline, but that the story of
American civic engagement is one of both "collapse and renewal."78
Putnam's book is empirically based on the study of a rich collection of survey
data, rendering insights that have at least two important implications for our project of
defining community in the context of the fair cross-section requirement. First, the data
demonstrate that the size of the community makes a difference in terms of civic
engagement. Second, there is apparently a generational shift in the way that the concept
of community is understood by Americans.
When early Progressive thinkers worried over the loss of community, they in part
manifested a privileging of the small town over what was described (often quite
accurately) as urban squalor.79 Dewey and others believed that the connectedness of
relationships in smaller communities led to a better quality of democracy.80 Putnam's
study of recent data seems to bear out the early reformers' intuition that the size of the
community makes a difference in civic engagement: "formal volunteering, working on

effectiveness—can be maximized and the negative manifestations—sectarianism,
ethnocentrism, corruption—minimized." Id. at 22.
77
"Debates about the waxing and waning of 'community' have been endemic for at least
two centuries . . . We seem perennially tempted to contrast our tawdry todays with past
golden ages." Id. at 24.
78
Id. at 25.
79
Id. at 378-79.
80
Id. at 377-80. These communitarian Progressives were not necessarily pessimistic
about the possibility of civic engagement in larger settings, however: "As historian
Quandt describes the optimistic outlook of these reformers, 'The easy sense of belonging,
the similarity of experience, and the ethic of participation might be more easily
maintained in the small locality than anywhere else, but this did not preclude their
cultivation in different soil.'" Id. at 380, quoting JEAN QUANDT, FROM THE SMALL TOWN
TO THE GREAT COMMUNITY: THE SOCIAL THOUGHT OF PROGRESSIVE INTELLECTUALS at
10 (1970).
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community projects, informal helping behavior (like coming to the aid of a stranger),
charitable giving, and perhaps blood donation are all more common in small towns than
in big cities."81 This supports the common-sense intuition that the smaller the
community, the more cohesive its ties, and, presumably, its values—or, conversely, that
as community boundaries are drawn more broadly, values are less likely to be shared.
A second important insight of Putnam's study shows a generational divide on
civic engagement. He found that people born before 1946 were "nearly twice as likely to
feel a sense of belonging to their neighborhood, to their church, to their local community,
and to the various groups and organizations to which they belong" as Gen X'ers born after
1964.82 Interestingly, though both groups were intimately tied to their families and
friends, the younger generation was markedly less engaged with their local
communities.83 Putnam struggles with possible explanations for the generational
difference, noting the near-impossibility of sorting cause from effect in this complicated
context.84 Without reaching any definite conclusion, Putnam is dismissive of the
possibility that the rise of "big government" is somehow a causative factor in the decline
in civic engagement.85 But in the particular context of the jury, it is worth exploring the
possibility that as the jury pool widens, the potential for genuine community input into
jury decisionmaking declines. For as the "community" represented by the jury is
enlarged, the probability of cohesive values that might bind jurors together is lessened.
Thus, the enlargement of the jury pool (by federalizing) has the effect of diluting
81

Id. at 119. For more data on the impact of community size on altruism, see references
listed in note 10 to Chapter 7 in Putnam's book. Id. at 463.
82
Id. at 274. Baby boomers fell midway between those two groups. Id. at 275.
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Id.
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Id. at 277-84.
85
Id. at 281-82.
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community values. This, in turn, may well produce the second-order effect of rendering
public sentiment that is at best dismissive of, and at worst disdainful of, jury service.
This is not to say that the only places in which community-wide values can be
cultivated must, necessarily, have small populations. Sociologist Herbert Gans has
described "urban villages" within large cities like Boston and New York, where people of
various ethnic groups live together, know each other and their local merchants, and look
out for each others' safety and children.86 Nor does this argument lead to a call for return
to the smaller, traditional communities of yesteryear (which tended toward complete
homogeneity and, often, rigid authoritarianism).87 Rather, as Etzioni argues, "[w]hat we
need now are communities that balance both diversity and unity . . . we need to
strengthen the communitarian elements in the urban and suburban centers, to provide the
social bonds that sustain the moral voice, but at the same time avoid tight networks that
suppress pluralism and dissent."88
In an effort to sketch the communitarian agenda, Etzioni has drafted a document
called The Responsive Communitarian Platform: Rights and Responsibilities. 89 One
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See HERBERT J. GANS, THE URBAN VILLAGERS: GROUP AND CLASS IN THE LIFE OF
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LIBERALISM AND THE POLITICS OF RACE IN NEW YORK (1990), cited in ETZIONI, THE
SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY, supra note 54, at 120. Daniel Bell makes a similar point: in
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Woody Allen's identity?". BELL, supra note 63, at 105-06.
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See ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY, supra note 54, at 122.
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Id. at 122.
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ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY, supra note 54, at 251-267. As the author
explains, the platform was first drafted by Etzioni himself, and was later significantly
edited and rewritten by a large number of others, including Mary Ann Glendon and
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point made in the platform is that communities are weakened when tasks they should
rightfully perform are usurped by larger institutions: "Generally, no social task should be
assigned to an institution that is larger than necessary to do the job. . . . What can be done
at the local level should not be passed on to the state or federal level[.]"90 The platform
then articulates duties that communities should expect from their members, notably
voting and jury service.91

B. Postmodern Theory: The Interpretive Community
In his famous book Is There a Text in this Class?,92 literary theorist Stanley Fish
took on the conundrum that was the raging debate in literary circles of the time: does
meaning reside in the text or is it constructed by the reader of the text? Choosing either
of those options was problematic: if the text had determinate meaning, then how to
explain disagreement? But if individual readers determined the meaning so that a text's
meaning varies with each reader, then how to explain agreement? Fish sought an
explanation accounting for both agreement and disagreement, and thus set out to answer
how a postmodernist like himself who "preach[ed] the instability of the text and the
unavailability of determinate meanings"93 could explain how different people could find

William Galston. It was eventually endorsed by seventy leading Americans, both
conservative and liberal. Id. at 251.
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Id. at 260.
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Id. at 261. Elsewhere in his book, Etzioni describes communities as "Chinese nesting
boxes, in which less encompassing communities (families, neighborhoods) are nestled
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not geographically based. Id.
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FISH, IS THERE A TEXT, supra note 7.
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Id. at 305.
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the same meaning in a given text.94 He did so by articulating the concept of the
"interpretive community," which he later described as:
Not so much a group of individuals who shared a point of view, but a
point of view or way of organizing experience that shared individuals in
the sense that its assumed distinctions, categories of understanding , and
stipulations of relevance and irrelevance were the content of the
consciousness of community members who were therefore no longer
individuals, but, insofar as they were embedded in the community's
enterprise, community property . . . such community-constituted
interpreters would, in their turn, constitute, more or less in agreement, the
same text, although the sameness would not be attributable to the selfidentity of the text, but to the communal nature of the interpretive act.95

Fish's idea of the interpretive community thus suggests that people's
understanding of texts, and indeed of facts96 and presumably norms, is constructed by the
communities of which they are a part. He is careful to distinguish this view from
subjectivity or relativism: it is not relativistic because "a shared basis of agreement at
once guid[es] interpretation and provid[es] a mechanism for deciding between
interpretations";97 it is not subjective because the interpretive strategies by which
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Or explain, for that matter, how meaningful human communication could ever occur.
See id. at 303-304.
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STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE
PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES at 141 (1989).
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See FISH, IS THERE A TEXT, supra note 7, at 338 ("[D]isagreements cannot be resolved
by reference to the facts, because the facts emerge only in the context of some point of
view . . . disagreements must occur between those who hold (or are held by) different
points of view, and what is at stake in a disagreement is the right to specify what the facts
can hereafter be said to be. Disagreements are not settled by the facts, but are the means
by which the facts are settled.").
97
Id. at 317. Indeed, Fish argues that "no one can be a relativist, because no one can
achieve the distance from his own beliefs and assumptions which would result in their
being no more authoritative for him than the beliefs and assumptions held by others, or,
for that matter, the beliefs and assumptions he himself used to hold." Id. at 319.
Interpreters do not, in fact cannot, act on their own; they are "extensions of an
institutional community [and thus] solipsism and relativism are removed as fears because
they are not possible modes of being." Id. at 321.
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meanings are constructed are "social and conventional."98 Moreover, Fish characterizes
interpretive communities as "engines of change because [their] assumptions are not a
mechanism for shutting out the world but for organizing it, for seeing phenomena as
already related to the interests and goals that make the community what it is."99 And
though persons within interpretive communities are not free agents, since their
interpretive assumptions and strategies are a product of the community of which they are
a part, neither are their ideas (nor those of their communities) fixed or immutable.
Rather, both the members and their interpretive communities are constantly evolving, in
an ongoing project that is "at the same time assimilative and self-transforming."100
Later in his career, Fish explicitly applied his ideas about literary interpretation to
law. In a series of essays framed as debates between Fish and the leading legal theorists
of the day,101 Fish exported the central problem of literary theory—that is, what is the
source of interpretive authority, the text or the reader?—to the context of legal
interpretation. In particular, he focused on the process of judging: as judges make
decisions, they must use texts in the forms of both precedents and statutes. In these
essays, Fish continued to argue that legal interpreters (that is, judges) are neither
constrained by embedded meaning in the text nor wholly free to imbue the text with
whatever meaning they might choose. Rather, "[i]nterpreters are constrained by their
98

Id. at 331 ("[T]he 'you' who does the interpretative work . . . is a communal you and not
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Id. at 152.
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See Stanley Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature, in
DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY, supra note 93, at 87-102 (debate between Fish and
Ronald Dworkin); Stanley Fish, Fish v. Fiss, in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY, supra
note 93, at 120-140 (debate between Fish and Owen Fiss); Stanley Fish, Don't Know
Much About the Middle Ages: Posner on Law and Literature, in DOING WHAT COMES
NATURALLY, supra note 93, at 294-311 (debate between Fish and Richard Posner).
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tacit awareness of what is possible and not possible to do, what is and is not a reasonable
thing to say, what will and will not be heard as evidence, in a given enterprise; and it is
within those same constraints that they see and bring others to see the shape of the
documents to whose interpretation they are committed."102
Fish's notions that the law, as any other text, cannot and does not operate as a selfexecuting constraint in the process of judging and that interpretations are the product of
community-based understandings and assumptions have important implications for the
work of juries. Indeed, juries may be understood to be an artificially-created interpretive
community,103 formed in a particular case to construct a factual history and then to render
its legal meaning. The work of juries throughout a trial is interpretation in the sense Fish
describes: the texts to be interpreted are presented in formats both evidentiary
(documentary and testimonial) and instructive (jury instructions on the law). Thus, when
a jury is required to decide whether conduct is "negligent" or "reckless" or, in a death
penalty case, whether there are "mitigating" or "aggravating" circumstances, its decision
is the culmination of a series of interpretive acts. And those acts are not just the sum of
the individual responses of the twelve jurors involved to the evidence presented and the
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FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY, supra note 93, at 98 (in response to
Dworkin). See also id. at 126 (in response to Fiss: neither the text nor "disciplining
rules" can operate as a constraint on interpretation, and the "fear of unbridled
interpretation—of interpreters whose determinations of meaning are unconstrained—is
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This is not to say that because it is artificially-created, the jury is some sort of new or
freestanding interpretive community. Central to Fish's argument is the notion that one
cannot extricate oneself from the embedded assumptions and understandings that inform
one's interpretations. Thus, jurors could never come to a jury room as blank slates to
form a new interpretive community divorced from their previous social contexts. But
this, of course, supports my argument: it is precisely because jurors bring their preexisting "interpretive communities" with them to the jury room that makes their role in
establishing and confirming social norms so important.
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instructions given, but in a larger sense are the product of the embedded understandings
and assumptions of the interpretive communities of which those jurors are a part.

III. Synthesizing Theory and Practice: Why Community Matters
In this section, I consider the implications of the theoretical problem of defining
the relevant community from which a fair cross-section of jurors must be drawn in light
of the very practical reality that much more of our criminal law is now being prosecuted
at the federal level. I turn first to a description of this federalization trend, and then to an
analysis of its effect given the demographic data presented earlier, in light of the
communitarian and postmodern theory. Finally, I return to our case study of the innercity murder scenario as an illustration of why the notion of the relevant "community"
might indeed make a very real difference.

A. The Federalization of Street Crime
In 1997, the American Bar Association formed a task force to examine the
federalization trend in criminal law. The task force, chaired by former Attorney General
Edwin Meese,104 both documented that the trend exists and characterized it negatively, as
"inappropriate federalization."105
The task force began its report by tracing the history of federal criminal law. In
the early years of the Republic, the federal government had jurisdiction to prosecute very
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few crimes,106 all of which had to do with harm done to the federal government itself.107
The states exercised virtually exclusive control over criminal enforcement, largely
because crime was viewed as "a uniquely local concern."108 The federal government
made its first forays into what had previously been viewed as subjects within the states'
police powers in the years following the Civil War.109 Notably, Congress located its
constitutional power to reach crime formerly within the states' exclusive purview in the
Commerce Clause.110 Given the rapid technological change of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, the increasing movement of people, goods and services in
interstate commerce became a justification for federal intrusion into the criminal law via
the Commerce Clause. The movement toward federalization accelerated during the New
Deal years and beyond; indeed, today there are more than 3,000 federal crimes.111 The
Task Force further noted that the trend, far from abating, is growing.112 Some 40% of
federal criminal provisions passed by Congress since the Civil War were passed in the
106

See Kathleen F. Brickey, The Commerce Clause and Federalized Crime: A Tale of
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n.11.
112
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period since 1970.113 In the 105th Congress, an estimated 1,000 bills with some
connection to criminal law were introduced.114 The Task Force further noted the
concomitant growth in the size of federal criminal justice services, made necessary in
order to cope with the growing number of crimes being processed in the federal
system.115
The Task Force attributed the federalization trend to Congress's "patchwork
response" to newsworthy events and the political popularity of crime legislation.116
Moreover, there seems to have been a systemic failure of federalism reflected in the
trend: federal crime legislation passes without meaningful analysis of whether state and
local governments are better equipped to deal with the problem.117 Much of this
legislation overlaps, or even duplicates, existing state law.118
Having assembled the statistics that document the federalization trend, the Task
Force turned its attention to an analysis of the impact of this trend on both the federal
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system119 and state and local governments. The Task Force concluded that there was no
persuasive evidence that federalizing crime had a demonstrable, significant impact on
public safety.120 The reason for this may be that despite the staggeringly increased
number of federal crimes, the pursuit of actual federal prosecutions is still somewhat
limited by resource issues.121 Thus, "the selection of which crimes to investigate and
prosecute therefore requires a decisionmaking process which reflects highly selective
prioritizing by investigative agencies and federal prosecutors."122
This selectivity in federal prosecution, requiring as it does the exercise of federal
prosecutorial discretion,123 yields another potential concern given the demographic data
of the relevant state and federal jury pools. That is, it raises the possibility that the
federal prosecutorial power could be invoked in order to avoid an expected outcome in
particular state prosecutions based on the expected demographic makeup of the jury
pool.124
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whether to bring particular prosecutions, and that state prosecutors are usually more
directly accountable to the electorate. Id. at 32-35.
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Indeed, there is some evidence that federal death penalty prosecutions are being
undertaken precisely because the states where the crime occurred either don't have the
death penalty or are unlikely to impose it. For example, Michigan does not have a death
penalty; federal prosecutions for murder there make the defendant subject to capital
punishment in contravention of the apparent will of the majority of people in Michigan.
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The Task Force concluded its study by characterizing the federalization trend as
troubling.125 In particular, they expressed deep concern that local values would be lost in
the rush to federalize crime and impose national standards:
Local crimes involve local values and should be handled by state law.
Each state's criminal justice system embodies a series of state decisions
about what conduct should be subjected to governmental control and
criminal sanctions (prison or fine) and about what socially unacceptable
conduct should be left outside those criminal prohibitions (left perhaps to
private social pressures, to moral restraints, or perhaps to non-criminal
suits between individuals or between governmental agencies and
individuals). Community views also differ from state to state on related
issues: the appropriate limits on police investigative practices, acceptable
prosecutorial discretion, the locale of trials, suitable court procedures and
rules of evidence, the exact penal consequences that should accompany
conviction, and the wisest allocation of limited resources to confront the
important problem of crime. In the participatory democracy of our large
nation, with varying local values, citizen views about such matters are
more likely to be felt and acted upon through representatives at the local
level, rather than at the federal level where most of those in power are
more removed from the affected local values and more preoccupied with
issues of national and international concern. 126

Though the Task Force expressed its concern in relation to the community's role
in articulating criminal standards through its elected representatives (that is, legislatively)
and the more direct that role would be in state and local governments, its conclusions
apply with equal force to the community's role in giving content to criminal standards
through jury service. In both contexts, more localized community norms are better
expressed through more localized prosecutions.
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ABA Task Force Report, supra note 102, at 43.
Id. at 44 (emphasis added).
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B. The Implications of a More Localized Understanding of Community for
Drawing a Fair Cross-section of Jurors
If the community to be represented by the fair cross-section of the jury is better
defined at a more local level, then the concern becomes the monolithic character of many
communities. One thinks immediately of the all-white jury in Simi Valley, California,
that acquitted the police officers who, as all the world knew from the video tape, had
beaten Rodney King. As Putnam notes, communities often produce negative externalities
for those outside their boundaries. Is it possible to preserve the positive values of local
communities without ensconcing negative ones?
This huge question harkens back to a point long debated by communitarians and
liberals as to the normative value of a community's views. Without purporting to take on
that debate here, we can perhaps escape the conundrum by developing a more nuanced
and situational definition of what "community" (or polity) is relevant for a particular
purpose.127 It is fitting that a much larger community—namely, the state—defines
through the criminal code what behavior will be sanctioned by the criminal process.128
But where the criminal code leaves issues to be determined by jury (community)
127

Daniel Bell, through his character of the communitarian Anne, approaches the problem
this way: "While I don't think one can appeal to 'objective' standards of morality,
standards not dependent on the actual historical processes of societies, there's another
possibility—a universalism rooted in the convergence of people's understanding of
certain core moral propositions. Every society, it seems, has come to accept a bare set of
prohibitions—on murder, deception, betrayal, and gross cruelty—prohibitions which
constitute a kind of minimal and universal moral code." BELL, supra note 63, at 76.
128
In The Spirit of Community, Etzioni makes a similar point in his explication of the
communitarian agenda: after noting the importance of the "social webs that communities
provide, in neighborhoods, at work, and in ethnic clubs and associations" and that
"government needs to refrain from usurping [the communities' institutional] functions,"
Etzioni further argues that "the national society must ensure that local communities will
not lock in values that we, as a more encompassing and overriding community, abhor[.]"
ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY, supra note 54, at 248.
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discretion, a more localized vision of community may better serve the end of affirming
community values.
Note that this is decidedly not an argument for anything akin to jury nullification
(as, arguably, the first Rodney King verdict in Simi Valley is an example). If the
criminal code defines aggravated battery as the use of deadly force on another person,
and the evidence shows that the defendant did that, the jury is not free to ignore either the
law or the evidence. But if the law asks the jury to give content to words as vague as
"mitigating circumstances" that would obviate a death sentence, the community's values
take center stage in the deliberation process.
Moreover, while concerns about self-interested community action are real, and are
vividly illustrated by such outrages as the first Rodney King verdict, they do not obviate
the need for, and indeed the inevitability of, the community performing its norm-setting
function.129 That is, inevitably some community, acting through some institutional
vehicle, will set moral norms. The project thus becomes a question of allocating moral
questions to the appropriate polity.130
My position is that local communities, charged as they have traditionally and
historically been with the execution of the criminal law, continue to be the better arbiters
of ambiguities within the law. The federalization trend in criminal law is divesting local
communities of that traditional role, and is doing so at the expense of both community
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Indeed, American society is replete with examples of local deviation from national
norms – consider the persistence of school prayer in many areas in contravention of the
Supreme Court rulings that such practices violate the First Amendment.
130
Cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (Supreme Court strikes down, as violative of
national equal protection norms, a Colorado state constitutional amendment adopted by
referendum that was designed to undo protections given to gay and lesbian citizens by
local governmental entities).
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values and genuine racial diversity in the jury system. For whatever geographical polity
defines the community from which a fair cross-section of jurors will be drawn will then
establish its social norms through the juries' decisionmaking. And just as gerrymandered
political districts frequently have the effect of diluting minority voting power,131
federalized jury districts have the effect of diluting minority community values that
would otherwise be expressed through criminal juries drawn more locally in state courts.
The key is to understand the local community's function, through the institution of
the criminal jury in individual trials, as giving immediate, fact-based content to the larger
community's moral proclamations as expressed in the criminal code. This approach
avoids the potential dangers of separatist local community action (as in the Simi Valley
Rodney King verdict) while preserving the community-strengthening and legitimating
effects of local decisionmaking. The local jury thus acts as the interpreter and enforcer,
in particularized fact situations, of the supracommunity's more general value judgments.
As Etzioni notes, "the more one favors strengthening communities . . . the more one must
concern oneself with ensuring that they see themselves as parts of a more encompassing
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Kim Forde-Mazrui has argued that jurors should no longer be drawn on an at-large
basis from the judicial district that hosts the trial. Rather, courts should subdivide their
districts into “jural districts” in an effort to capture “communities of interest” as that
concept has developed by the Supreme Court in electoral districting cases. FordeMazrui, Jural Districting, supra note 2, at 388-395. Jurors for particular cases would be
selected such that each of those districts would be represented in the petit jury, or at least
the venire. In the electoral context, the Supreme Court has approved the use of race as a
factor (though not the sole factor) along with other demographic characteristics like
political affiliation and socioeconomic status, in drawing legislative districts. Id. at 38384. This plan would thus promote the representation of minority groups on juries, as long
as the “jural districts” are drawn to capture neighborhoods with a high minority
population. As Professor Forde-Masrui acknowledges, however, the plan would impose
significant administrative burdens and costs. Id. at 400-403.
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whole, rather than as fully independent and antagonistic."132 He further argues that this
makes it possible for smaller, constituent communities "to follow their own subsets of
values without endangering the body society, as long as they accept these shared
values."133 The problem posed by the federalization of criminal juries is that these
subsets of values held in minority communities, though not incompatible with the larger
community's "shared values" as expressed in the criminal code, are in danger of being
subsumed by the larger majority.134
Indeed, the notion of "constitutive communities" that give content to one's values
may have particular resonance in a minority community. Recall that communitarian
theory uses community members' self-identification as a means of identifying
community.135 In answer to the question "who are you?", how many whites in America
would answer "I am white"? Whiteness as an identity is obviated by a society that
privileges whiteness in countless overt and covert ways.136 But identification with a
minority racial or ethnic group is more likely to be a key component of one's selfunderstanding in a society that often oppresses and suppresses that group. Thus, there is
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ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY, supra note 54, at 155.
Id. at 157.
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As highlighted earlier, this is akin to the problem of the dilution of minority voting
power by gerrymandering electoral districts. See supra notes ______ and accompanying
text.
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See supra notes _____ and accompanying text (Daniel Bell's discussion of constitutive
communities).
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See generally IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE: UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF
RACE AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION (2001) (documenting race discrimination effects in
contexts such as car buying and kidney transplantation).
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arguably an obligation on the larger supracommunity to arrange its institutions (such as
the jury) in a way that allows expression of values held dear in minority communities.137

C. From Theory to Practice: A Case Study in the Effect of Federally Diluted Jury
Pools
This section addresses the question whether the confluence of the demographic
effect of the federalization of crime with the communitarian and postmodern theory
explored above has any real-world implications. The case study described in the
introduction will serve as a vehicle to examine that question. Imagine a gun-store
robbery/murder allegedly committed by an African-American youth in Philadelphia. If
the youth is tried in the state court system, his jury will be drawn from the county of
Philadelphia, where the African American population constitutes 43.2% of the total
population. If he is charged under federal law and tried in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, the African-American population percentage is 16.8%.
Of course, neither of these figures portends any particular demographic makeup
of the petit jury that will try the case. The question becomes, then, whether the added
probability of having any black jury members makes a difference. Empirical research
indicates that it does. David Baldus and colleagues studied data on capital juries in
Philadelphia in the years 1984 through 1994. Their findings indicate that "black
defendants are treated less punitively vis-à-vis nonblack defendants as the proportion of
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One might even frame an argument that this obligation is analogous to that justifying
remedial measures in cases of de jure discrimination under the Equal Protection clause.
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blacks on the juries increases."138 Moreover, as the number of black jurors increases,
death sentences become less likely.139 Similar findings emerged from the Capital Jury
Project, which is a national study of the decisionmaking of capital jurors, based on
interviews with 1,155 capital jurors involved in 340 trials in fourteen different states.140
The study authors found two strong impacts of jury racial composition in cases involving
black defendants and white victims, which they referred to as the "white male
dominance" effect and the "black male presence" effect.141 Specifically, "the presence of
five or more white males on the jury dramatically increased the likelihood of a death
sentence between cases with four and those with five white male jurors (23.1% vs.
63.2%). . . . [and t]he presence of black male jurors in these B/W cases, by contrast,
substantially reduced the likelihood of a death sentence."142 The addition of one black
male juror made a stark statistical difference: "[i]n the absence of black male jurors,
death sentences were imposed in 71.9% of the cases, as compared to 42.9% when one
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David Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman
Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 1638, 1721 n.159 (1998). See also David Baldus et al., The Use of
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PA. J. CONST. L. 3 (2001).
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Baldus et al.,The Use of Peremptory Challenges, supra note 136.
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William J. Bowers, Benjamin D. Steiner & Marla Sandys, Death Sentencing in Black
and White: An Empirical Analysis of the Role of Jurors' Race and Jury Racial
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black male was on the jury."143 Significantly, the authors found that these effects were
independent of one another, further intensifying the statistical disparity.144
It thus becomes apparent that juror decisionmaking in capital cases is highly
sensitive to the demographic makeup of the jury. Substantively, this is no doubt related
to the areas of discretion built into capital sentencing schemes. For example,
Pennsylvania law requires jurors in capital cases to consider aggravating and mitigating
factors in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed.145 Many of the
listed statutory factors engage the jurors in a discretionary evaluation of highly
contextualized conduct.146 This discretionary space is exactly the reason why juries
drawn from a fair cross-section of the relevant community is so important.

CONCLUSION
The criminal justice system, understood in its broadest sense to include the
combined law enforcement efforts of both federal and state governments, relies for its
legitimacy on a sense of public investment, most importantly manifested in the direct
community participation of the criminal jury. The trend toward federalization of crime,
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Id. at 193. "The difference rose to thirty-four points when the comparison was
between none and one or more black male jurors (71.9% vs. 37.5%)." Id.
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That is, in the absence of white male dominance, the presence of one black male juror
yielded an even lower rate of imposition of the death sentence; conversely, the absence of
black male jurors yielded an even higher rate of imposition. Id. at 193-94.
145
See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711 (2004). Indeed, this is typical of the capital sentencing
schemes of the states that impose the death penalty, and of the federal capital sentencing
statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 3592.
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For example, jurors might be called upon to decide whether “the defendant was under
the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.” 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 9711(e)(2). Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)(2) (“The defendant was under unusual and
substantial duress, regardless of whether the duress was of such a degree as to constitute a
defense to the charge.”).
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particularly street crime, threatens that legitimacy by removing the immediacy of local
control and changing the demographics of those called to serve on juries. And this is not
merely a theoretical threat: as I have demonstrated, federalization in capital cases can
possibly, and quite literally, mean the difference between life and death.
The impact of this apparently gathering trend147 thus becomes something akin to
the dilution effect observed in voting rights cases. Just as the minority vote gets diluted
in at-large districting schemes, but can be captured by demographically-sensitive
districting, the values of minority communities are more likely to be subsumed in juries
drawn from larger federal districts than they would be in smaller, county-based state
court juries.
One question worth exploring is whether there is a causal connection between the
federalization of crime and the minority dilution effect on criminal juries. Regardless,
the effect is real, and ought to be a consideration both for legislators who define crime
and officials who select which prosecutions to pursue. The legitimacy of the criminal
justice system is at stake.
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See supra notes ______ and accompanying text (describing growing trend of
federalizing crime).
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